Honduras: Conundrum for the Obama Administration

On the face of it, the current crisis in Honduras is a simple problem of restoring democratic rule. The simple solution is for the OAS and the United Nations to find a way to return Manuel Zelaya to the presidency for the remaining months of his term.

But underneath this simple problem lies a difficult and perilous reality for the Obama Administration as it tries to figure out what it's policies will be in Central America, indeed, in Latin America.

In Honduras there are two major political parties: Liberal and Conservative. Over history they have traded the presidency back and forth with neither having too much room to manuever given the overwhelming poverty of the country, the lack of real natural resources and the presence of a powerful military establishment which has been aligned with the business and social elite. All the presidents, from either party, have ties to the ruling elite.

Manuel Zelaya is from the Liberal party which just held its internal elections to name a Presidential candidate for the next elections to be held later this year. The candidate they chose was Elvin Ernesto Santos, the CEO of a large construction firm and, until his being named as the Presidential candidate, the Vice-President of Honduras. Upon being named the Liberal Presidential candidate, Santos resigned the Vice-Presidency. His biggest competitor in the race for the nomination was Roberto Micheletti, the head of the Congress and, now, the newly installed president of the Country. In other words, Zelaya is either a little bit too stupid or a true megalmaniac to think that he can defy the army, his own party and the elite who control all the parties by trying to establish himself as a President who rules above and beyond the influence of the traditional centers of power.

Still, you can be president and be stupid. For this reason, the majority of the Central American countries have one term limits on the presidency. And, even if you are stupid and subject to bouts of meglamania, the regional stability of democracies will be the basis by which the UN and the OAS take their positions with a vested interest in keeping the rule of law and the overt and covert power of the military establishments in check. So, for the army, even if mandated by the Supreme Court to do so, to pull off a coup is also a self-defeating and disempowering action. Other military establishments in the region manage to continue to have power and control without resorting to coups. It is doubtful that any other miliatry establishment in Central America would support the Honduran Military in this action. To the contrary, this action serves to ruin the tacit agreements within the neighboring countries as to how the military can exercise its power without resorting to coups which, for their destabilizing nature, no one likes.

The problem for the US is that these stupidities could have been avoided if Central American and US Military policy for the region were clear. The two Honduran Generals who had the most to do with the coup - Army General Romeo Vasquez and Air Force General Luis Suazo are both graduates of the US Army School of the Americas and the US has a rather significant military contingent in Honduras as part of the Southern Command on the grounds of a Honduran Air Base called Soto Cano about sixty miles from the capital. The combination of the military presence, the size of US Aid to Honduras and the fact the US is the leading trading partner of Honduras gives the US more power than to just "work to see that the coup would not have happened" as the reports are saying. The US had the power to stop the coup.

One question to be raised for the US public is to know why we did no use this power to its fullest and/or if there are major conflicts within the US administration between the military and state department on policy in Central/Latin America. That the US did not stop the coup is a sign that it does not yet have a firm grip on the policy or the pulse of Latin America because stopping the coup could hae avoided what now presents a series of difficulties that threaten to diminish the bright star that the Obama administration brought with it when assuming the US presidency.

Newly installed Micheletti has proven why his own party would not name his to be the presidential candidate with a series of statements the content of which is nothing more than bravado. Micheletti claims the military is ready to repulse any military intervention. The Honduran military is powerful within the politics of Honduras, but it is not an effective fighting force. It would crumble before any effective military action and the US controls the Honduran Air Force.

Of all the Central American presidents, only Daniel Ortega, his own star significantly diminished by a long history of disappointing personal and political decisions, has been vocal, above the crowd, in denouncing the coup. Hopefully this is the result of these presidents, mostly from the left of the political spectrum, recognizing that the rhetoric of Venezuelan's Chavez and Nicaragua's Ortega does nothing to further their strength for governing nor their party's ability to continue to win elections. In fact, Zelaya, by going the strongman route, only diminished the left's political power in the region by stirring up suspicions that all the leftist presidents are really strongmen looking to become hegemonic leaders instead of party leaders and social leaders of their countries for a better economic life for the people.

so the Honduran military has alienated not only the political elite of the region, but also the military elite. Micheletti has further divided his own party and alienated all of the other Latin American countries and Zelaya has destroyed his party's chances for the next election and has only Chavez and Ortega as true friends.

It is a conundrum because returning Zelaya to power does not resolve the underlying problems. Returning Zelaya is necessary if the OAS and UN are to continue as important players in the region. And, returning Zelaya is necessary for the Obama Administration to demonstrate that it has turned the corner on previous interventionist foreign policy. But, when Zelaya is returned to power, Honduras is still in turmoil and Chavez and Ortega are srengthened which is not good for serious leaders of politically leftist parties in Latin America.

The refusal to withdraw the US Ambassador to Honduras and the decision not to immediately suspend aid may be a continuation of President Obama's tendency toward dialogue and including everybody in and thinking long and hard before taking dramatic action, but it only serves to create doubt in Latin America's mind as to whether the US has really turned the corner on its interventionist past and allows a situation that could be resolved quickly to be drawn out with each continuing day of crisis allowing the conundrums to deepen.

President Obama missed an opportunity to strengthen the multi-national approach to foreign policy by lagging behind others in taking dramatic action and, at the same time, allowed a bad situation to fester and destabilize the area, allowing Chavez and Ortega the space to raise their rhetoric and, eventually, claim a victory for the same.

At best, the Obama Administration will need to learn, from this incident, that prevention is a hundred times better than reaction. And, we have not yet heard from the Republicans as to how they will use this incident to detain whatever initiatives President Obama could have in mind to further the opening up of space for normalizing relations with Cuba.

Everything in Latin America is a conundrum to begin with. Clear, decisive and preventative action in favor the values shared by the OAS should be defining criteria for the current US Administration in all its relationships with the countries who share the continent with us. And, it might be good to rethink whether we really need a military base in Honduras.