We can all applaud the commitments of the Obama Administration for greater transparancy and improved openness in communication with the public. However, this week, it was apparant that these commitments and practices have limits and that this administration needs to learn the "no comment rules." Of course, rule #1 is when lawyers tell you, for real, that you cannot make any comment because of possible legal jeopardy or interference with a legal process. But there are also other times when "no comment" or it's equivalent is the best response for the administratin and for the country.
One rule would be that "no comment" or its equivalent is the best response when any other response runs the risk of gratutiously damaging the national interest, creating a problem that did not exist before, exacerbating a problem that already does exist or that serves to take the nation's eyes off the agenda that the administration wishes to emphasize.
There are ample examples of violations of this rule from the Obama administration just in this last week, beginning with the President's initial remarks in regard to the arrest of Harvard Professor Gates. Then we have Vice President Joe Biden making remarks in Georgia that did not pleast Russia and then remarks in an interview with the Wall Street Journal upon his return from Georgia which strained botht the relation with Georgia and Russia. To add to the mix, Hilary Clinton characterized the attempt of Honduran President Zelaya to return to his country after being deposed by the army as "reckless."
None of the remarks mentioned above were necessary, helpful or enlighening. All of them served to exacerbate exiting problems, create new ones and take the nation's eyes off the agenda that the administration wishes to emphasize.
The "equivalent" of a "no comment" was demonstrated to perfection, on the other hand, by the administration's nomination to the Supreme Court, Judge Sonya Sotomayor. There are numerous variations of themes which allow a person to give essentially a "no commnet" without saying those words. In Sotomayor's case it varied from saying the question raised a "hypothetical", to the fact that she might have to rule on a similar case involved in the question, or that she didn't have enough information about the state law that would apply...and on and on and on.
The "equivalents" of "no comment" need to be practiced and held always just a tip of the tongue away so that they can be quickly spit out even though one's mind is formulating what one really would want to say if they were not a member of the President's cabinet or staff.
It is still early in the Obama Adminstration and I am confident that the President himself, the Secretary of State and the Vice President will learn that in a week where the President was trying to keep himself and the nationa and the Congress focused on the dire need of the nation for a national health care plan it is not good to blow up incidents beyond proportion, needlesssly antagonize friends, increase the number of phone calls the President needs to make to repair damages or, in pursuit of building up democracy, to change the paradigm of "reckless" to apply to a harmless political stunt instead of a military coup.
Personally, I would be pleased to become the White House Consultant on when to invoke the "no comment" rule including training for all staff on the various acceptable forms of the "no comment equivalent." If the position is not contemplated, perhaps stimulus money could be found to crate just one more job.
Saturday, July 25, 2009
Petraeus Confirms Failure of Iraq War
General Petraeus, in an interview with a CNN correspondent in Baghdad, confirmed the failure of the war in Iraq when he stated that one of the remaining goals of the US presence is to ensure that the Iraqi forces have the capability of keeping Al Quaeda in check. Despite Bush and company's justification of the war on the basis of ties between Iraq and Al Quaeda, we know that these ties did not exist. Now, after several years of war and occupation, Al Quaeda is firmly established. We can thank the Bush administration for this incredible failure. I am sorry, it is more than a failure! It constitutes a positive help to Al Quaeda. We gave them the opportunity. It might also be worth mentioning that the Afghanistan war not only did not eliminate Al Quaeda, it gave them the opportunity to become an important force in Pakistan. In other words, two wars in the Middle East have done nothing to reduce Al Quaeda, but they have provided opportunity for Al Quaeda to expand its presence and influence in the area. To quote a Quaker bumpersticker: "War is Not the Answer."
Monday, July 13, 2009
Afghanistan: Obama’s Achilles Heel
President Bush and eight years of Republican rule left a huge list of problems for the nation to solve. Cleaning up the mess is a huge job considering that in addition to the mess of the economy, the mess in Iraq and the mess in Afghanistan there is also a long list of unresolved national questions and other foreign policy issues that have been badly managed and need a new start. So, how is President Obama doing on cleaning up the mess, addressing the unresolved issues and starting over on a host of foreign policy questions?
I think he is doing very well. The economy is starting to and will come around, the question is how long it will take, but I predict the Dow Jones will end the year over 9000 and, actually be closer to 9500. Iraq is going as well as could be expected although no one should hope that the pull out of troops will be without problems. The primary political challenges of putting together a nation still remain to be settled in Iraq and there could be a very big increase in national violence and, eventually something like a civil war, especially considering that the Kurdish question has not even been touched.
The starting over on foreign policy in the Middle East, China, North Korea, Russia, Iran and even Europre is also in pretty good shape. Although major question remain unresolved, the Obama/Clinton approach to developing a foreign policy and international relations has put the United States in good position to play a positive role in resolving these questions short of starting another inadvisable military action.
And, on the domestic issues it looks like both health care and immigration policy have a chance at renewal or repair within the next year if the Democrats can keep their house together for the fight against the special interests and the Republicans.
The Achilles heal of the Obama efforts to clean up, address unresolved national questions and start over is Afghanistan. Somebody should spend a good deal of time letting this administration know three things: Afghanistan is not our country, Afghanistan is not really a country, and Afghanistan has a 1600 mile border with Pakistan.
Let me repear what I have stated from the beginning and several times in this blog: The war in Afghanist was a mistake. It was a mistake because war was the wrong response to 9/11. Limited military and police action along with increase effectiveness in intelligence was the correct response. There is some hope that the Obama administration does really understand that we cannot win the war in Afghanistan. The question is whether the American people expect to win and if so, what they think winning means. For the moment we can achieve a limited victory in Helmand province to the west of Kahndahar where we have our tradtion stronghold in the south, but we cannot hold Helmand province for long, or inflict a major defeat on the Taliban. To think that Pakistan will do anything more than provide occassional efforts that look like they are making headway against Taliban and Al Quaeda strongholds in the border region is unrealistic. Pakistan will do well to achieve that the Taliban and Al Quaeda do not make military and political gains within their own country. Just remember that Paklistan has no interest in a stong and united Afghanistan. They already have a strong enemy to the east and do not want anything more than a buffer zone with Iran on the West. Then there is the 1600 mile border, most of which is sparsely populated mountain regions that provide no possibiliti4es for constant monitoring by Pakistan troops and, thus, provide ample opportunities for the rear guards of both the Taliban and Al Quaeda to rest, recuperate, train and replenish their numbers and their power.
In other words, we will be in Afghanistan for decades if the idea is to build an Afghanistan able to resist the efforts of the Taliban to destabalize the central government and to control key areas outside of Kabul. We need allies which is the reason that the Russian agreement to allow us to use their air space was a very important gain for the Obama adminsitration. The Russians, if they so desired, could dreate havoc in Afghanistan and Pakistan if they cose to, by just refusing to do certain things and provide clandestine aid to the Taliban and Al Quaeda as we did to the same folks when the Russians were occupying Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, even having allies will not win the day for us, as none of these alies will agree to send more troops since they all believe they should not have to pay dearly for our mistakes.
The Taliban are not our enemy nor should they be our target of operations in Afghanistan. This is why the operation in Helmand province is ill advised and has no possibility for long term gain. Our enemy is Al Quaeda as long as they remian a radical, fundamental group with the goal of destroying our society. Our goal is, therefore, to defuse this threat to our security or at leats to so interupt their normal operations that they remain a limited and controlled factor in the workd of terrorists.
The military/police/intelligence strategy that we need to initiate would not include sending our troops out to take large tracts of land and destroy poppy fields. The end result of this strategy is to increase our military vulnerability and raise the price of heroin without affecting the income provided to our enemies by these crops or inflicting significant damage on their military capability.
Therefore, talking with the Taliban and Al Quaeda is a good strategy, although making a deal with one, the other or both is a dangerious proposition. Neverheless, if there can be an accomosation which serves to stabilize the region and increase our national security concern related to terrorism directed at us, then it will pay good dividends. The degree to which we can assist Afghanistan gain a more effective central governent either by military action or foreign aid should be determined solely on the basis fo what serves the strategy to contrain Al Quaeda. Sorry about that, Afghanistan. I can only say that when you made the deal with Bush to help you overthrow the Taliban, you made a bad deal with a bad dealer. In fact the US never had the ability or the commitment to follow through on its promises. It is a mess, but a mess that needs to be cleaned up not by following through on misguided policies and promises, but on rewriting the policy and limiting the promises to what we actually are capable of doing and limiting the promises to those areas where fulfilling the promise also advances our primary goal of restricting the ability of Al Quaeda to traing and implement terrorism in that region and around the world.
Achilles heel injuries can take an otherwise healthy athlete out for a season even thoug h the rest of the body is fully capable of functioning at a high level. Afghanistan could be just this Achilles heel for the Obama administration. Special attention should be paid to making sure we do not suffer this injury.
I think he is doing very well. The economy is starting to and will come around, the question is how long it will take, but I predict the Dow Jones will end the year over 9000 and, actually be closer to 9500. Iraq is going as well as could be expected although no one should hope that the pull out of troops will be without problems. The primary political challenges of putting together a nation still remain to be settled in Iraq and there could be a very big increase in national violence and, eventually something like a civil war, especially considering that the Kurdish question has not even been touched.
The starting over on foreign policy in the Middle East, China, North Korea, Russia, Iran and even Europre is also in pretty good shape. Although major question remain unresolved, the Obama/Clinton approach to developing a foreign policy and international relations has put the United States in good position to play a positive role in resolving these questions short of starting another inadvisable military action.
And, on the domestic issues it looks like both health care and immigration policy have a chance at renewal or repair within the next year if the Democrats can keep their house together for the fight against the special interests and the Republicans.
The Achilles heal of the Obama efforts to clean up, address unresolved national questions and start over is Afghanistan. Somebody should spend a good deal of time letting this administration know three things: Afghanistan is not our country, Afghanistan is not really a country, and Afghanistan has a 1600 mile border with Pakistan.
Let me repear what I have stated from the beginning and several times in this blog: The war in Afghanist was a mistake. It was a mistake because war was the wrong response to 9/11. Limited military and police action along with increase effectiveness in intelligence was the correct response. There is some hope that the Obama administration does really understand that we cannot win the war in Afghanistan. The question is whether the American people expect to win and if so, what they think winning means. For the moment we can achieve a limited victory in Helmand province to the west of Kahndahar where we have our tradtion stronghold in the south, but we cannot hold Helmand province for long, or inflict a major defeat on the Taliban. To think that Pakistan will do anything more than provide occassional efforts that look like they are making headway against Taliban and Al Quaeda strongholds in the border region is unrealistic. Pakistan will do well to achieve that the Taliban and Al Quaeda do not make military and political gains within their own country. Just remember that Paklistan has no interest in a stong and united Afghanistan. They already have a strong enemy to the east and do not want anything more than a buffer zone with Iran on the West. Then there is the 1600 mile border, most of which is sparsely populated mountain regions that provide no possibiliti4es for constant monitoring by Pakistan troops and, thus, provide ample opportunities for the rear guards of both the Taliban and Al Quaeda to rest, recuperate, train and replenish their numbers and their power.
In other words, we will be in Afghanistan for decades if the idea is to build an Afghanistan able to resist the efforts of the Taliban to destabalize the central government and to control key areas outside of Kabul. We need allies which is the reason that the Russian agreement to allow us to use their air space was a very important gain for the Obama adminsitration. The Russians, if they so desired, could dreate havoc in Afghanistan and Pakistan if they cose to, by just refusing to do certain things and provide clandestine aid to the Taliban and Al Quaeda as we did to the same folks when the Russians were occupying Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, even having allies will not win the day for us, as none of these alies will agree to send more troops since they all believe they should not have to pay dearly for our mistakes.
The Taliban are not our enemy nor should they be our target of operations in Afghanistan. This is why the operation in Helmand province is ill advised and has no possibility for long term gain. Our enemy is Al Quaeda as long as they remian a radical, fundamental group with the goal of destroying our society. Our goal is, therefore, to defuse this threat to our security or at leats to so interupt their normal operations that they remain a limited and controlled factor in the workd of terrorists.
The military/police/intelligence strategy that we need to initiate would not include sending our troops out to take large tracts of land and destroy poppy fields. The end result of this strategy is to increase our military vulnerability and raise the price of heroin without affecting the income provided to our enemies by these crops or inflicting significant damage on their military capability.
Therefore, talking with the Taliban and Al Quaeda is a good strategy, although making a deal with one, the other or both is a dangerious proposition. Neverheless, if there can be an accomosation which serves to stabilize the region and increase our national security concern related to terrorism directed at us, then it will pay good dividends. The degree to which we can assist Afghanistan gain a more effective central governent either by military action or foreign aid should be determined solely on the basis fo what serves the strategy to contrain Al Quaeda. Sorry about that, Afghanistan. I can only say that when you made the deal with Bush to help you overthrow the Taliban, you made a bad deal with a bad dealer. In fact the US never had the ability or the commitment to follow through on its promises. It is a mess, but a mess that needs to be cleaned up not by following through on misguided policies and promises, but on rewriting the policy and limiting the promises to what we actually are capable of doing and limiting the promises to those areas where fulfilling the promise also advances our primary goal of restricting the ability of Al Quaeda to traing and implement terrorism in that region and around the world.
Achilles heel injuries can take an otherwise healthy athlete out for a season even thoug h the rest of the body is fully capable of functioning at a high level. Afghanistan could be just this Achilles heel for the Obama administration. Special attention should be paid to making sure we do not suffer this injury.
Saturday, July 4, 2009
Run, Sarah, Run
NPR reports today that they were contacted by someone from out in Alaska who stated that the Eastern Establishment just doesn't understand the way that Sarah Palin thinks and, therefore, they will always get the analysis wrong about why she decided to resign as governor with 16 months left to serve. One remedy to this situation would have been that Sarah Palin would have given a clear reason for the decision. One clear reason could have been that she is going to make a run for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and she did not want to spend state time and money campaigning for the nomination. This is a clear and understandable reason with which her constituents can agree or disagree. But, this, evidently, is not the way that Sarah Palin thinks.
The Democrats would, of course, welcome the prospect of Palin as the Republican candidate. Democrats who want President Obama to continue for a second term ought to be encouraging Sarah Palin to campaign for the Republican nomination, hope that she gets the nomination and thank God every day that she will be the Republican Presidential nominee for the next Presidential election. The debate can be over how long Palin will serve as President, if elected. Will it be 2 years before she decides that her own agenda is more important than what the voters elected her to do. Or, maybe she will even get as far as 3 years into her term before she calls a press conference on the south lawn to announce that she thinks she can push her agenda for reform better from outside the Whitehouse than inside. There could be "resignation watches" established and a national lottery to place bets on how many days into her term she would resign.
Normally, when public officials give confusing rasons for decisions, there is something to hide. For the moment, this looks like someone running away from responsibility and giving multiple reasons in the hope someone will believe one of them. What she is running from could be something as simple as the responsibility of having to govern or it could be the ethics probes. If this is not the case and she really is resigning early from elected office in order to run for a higher elected office, then Sarah has only managed to revive the idea that Alaska has more than its share of village idiots and is capable of electing them to public office.
The Democrats would, of course, welcome the prospect of Palin as the Republican candidate. Democrats who want President Obama to continue for a second term ought to be encouraging Sarah Palin to campaign for the Republican nomination, hope that she gets the nomination and thank God every day that she will be the Republican Presidential nominee for the next Presidential election. The debate can be over how long Palin will serve as President, if elected. Will it be 2 years before she decides that her own agenda is more important than what the voters elected her to do. Or, maybe she will even get as far as 3 years into her term before she calls a press conference on the south lawn to announce that she thinks she can push her agenda for reform better from outside the Whitehouse than inside. There could be "resignation watches" established and a national lottery to place bets on how many days into her term she would resign.
Normally, when public officials give confusing rasons for decisions, there is something to hide. For the moment, this looks like someone running away from responsibility and giving multiple reasons in the hope someone will believe one of them. What she is running from could be something as simple as the responsibility of having to govern or it could be the ethics probes. If this is not the case and she really is resigning early from elected office in order to run for a higher elected office, then Sarah has only managed to revive the idea that Alaska has more than its share of village idiots and is capable of electing them to public office.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Honduras: Conundrum for the Obama Administration
On the face of it, the current crisis in Honduras is a simple problem of restoring democratic rule. The simple solution is for the OAS and the United Nations to find a way to return Manuel Zelaya to the presidency for the remaining months of his term.
But underneath this simple problem lies a difficult and perilous reality for the Obama Administration as it tries to figure out what it's policies will be in Central America, indeed, in Latin America.
In Honduras there are two major political parties: Liberal and Conservative. Over history they have traded the presidency back and forth with neither having too much room to manuever given the overwhelming poverty of the country, the lack of real natural resources and the presence of a powerful military establishment which has been aligned with the business and social elite. All the presidents, from either party, have ties to the ruling elite.
Manuel Zelaya is from the Liberal party which just held its internal elections to name a Presidential candidate for the next elections to be held later this year. The candidate they chose was Elvin Ernesto Santos, the CEO of a large construction firm and, until his being named as the Presidential candidate, the Vice-President of Honduras. Upon being named the Liberal Presidential candidate, Santos resigned the Vice-Presidency. His biggest competitor in the race for the nomination was Roberto Micheletti, the head of the Congress and, now, the newly installed president of the Country. In other words, Zelaya is either a little bit too stupid or a true megalmaniac to think that he can defy the army, his own party and the elite who control all the parties by trying to establish himself as a President who rules above and beyond the influence of the traditional centers of power.
Still, you can be president and be stupid. For this reason, the majority of the Central American countries have one term limits on the presidency. And, even if you are stupid and subject to bouts of meglamania, the regional stability of democracies will be the basis by which the UN and the OAS take their positions with a vested interest in keeping the rule of law and the overt and covert power of the military establishments in check. So, for the army, even if mandated by the Supreme Court to do so, to pull off a coup is also a self-defeating and disempowering action. Other military establishments in the region manage to continue to have power and control without resorting to coups. It is doubtful that any other miliatry establishment in Central America would support the Honduran Military in this action. To the contrary, this action serves to ruin the tacit agreements within the neighboring countries as to how the military can exercise its power without resorting to coups which, for their destabilizing nature, no one likes.
The problem for the US is that these stupidities could have been avoided if Central American and US Military policy for the region were clear. The two Honduran Generals who had the most to do with the coup - Army General Romeo Vasquez and Air Force General Luis Suazo are both graduates of the US Army School of the Americas and the US has a rather significant military contingent in Honduras as part of the Southern Command on the grounds of a Honduran Air Base called Soto Cano about sixty miles from the capital. The combination of the military presence, the size of US Aid to Honduras and the fact the US is the leading trading partner of Honduras gives the US more power than to just "work to see that the coup would not have happened" as the reports are saying. The US had the power to stop the coup.
One question to be raised for the US public is to know why we did no use this power to its fullest and/or if there are major conflicts within the US administration between the military and state department on policy in Central/Latin America. That the US did not stop the coup is a sign that it does not yet have a firm grip on the policy or the pulse of Latin America because stopping the coup could hae avoided what now presents a series of difficulties that threaten to diminish the bright star that the Obama administration brought with it when assuming the US presidency.
Newly installed Micheletti has proven why his own party would not name his to be the presidential candidate with a series of statements the content of which is nothing more than bravado. Micheletti claims the military is ready to repulse any military intervention. The Honduran military is powerful within the politics of Honduras, but it is not an effective fighting force. It would crumble before any effective military action and the US controls the Honduran Air Force.
Of all the Central American presidents, only Daniel Ortega, his own star significantly diminished by a long history of disappointing personal and political decisions, has been vocal, above the crowd, in denouncing the coup. Hopefully this is the result of these presidents, mostly from the left of the political spectrum, recognizing that the rhetoric of Venezuelan's Chavez and Nicaragua's Ortega does nothing to further their strength for governing nor their party's ability to continue to win elections. In fact, Zelaya, by going the strongman route, only diminished the left's political power in the region by stirring up suspicions that all the leftist presidents are really strongmen looking to become hegemonic leaders instead of party leaders and social leaders of their countries for a better economic life for the people.
so the Honduran military has alienated not only the political elite of the region, but also the military elite. Micheletti has further divided his own party and alienated all of the other Latin American countries and Zelaya has destroyed his party's chances for the next election and has only Chavez and Ortega as true friends.
It is a conundrum because returning Zelaya to power does not resolve the underlying problems. Returning Zelaya is necessary if the OAS and UN are to continue as important players in the region. And, returning Zelaya is necessary for the Obama Administration to demonstrate that it has turned the corner on previous interventionist foreign policy. But, when Zelaya is returned to power, Honduras is still in turmoil and Chavez and Ortega are srengthened which is not good for serious leaders of politically leftist parties in Latin America.
The refusal to withdraw the US Ambassador to Honduras and the decision not to immediately suspend aid may be a continuation of President Obama's tendency toward dialogue and including everybody in and thinking long and hard before taking dramatic action, but it only serves to create doubt in Latin America's mind as to whether the US has really turned the corner on its interventionist past and allows a situation that could be resolved quickly to be drawn out with each continuing day of crisis allowing the conundrums to deepen.
President Obama missed an opportunity to strengthen the multi-national approach to foreign policy by lagging behind others in taking dramatic action and, at the same time, allowed a bad situation to fester and destabilize the area, allowing Chavez and Ortega the space to raise their rhetoric and, eventually, claim a victory for the same.
At best, the Obama Administration will need to learn, from this incident, that prevention is a hundred times better than reaction. And, we have not yet heard from the Republicans as to how they will use this incident to detain whatever initiatives President Obama could have in mind to further the opening up of space for normalizing relations with Cuba.
Everything in Latin America is a conundrum to begin with. Clear, decisive and preventative action in favor the values shared by the OAS should be defining criteria for the current US Administration in all its relationships with the countries who share the continent with us. And, it might be good to rethink whether we really need a military base in Honduras.
But underneath this simple problem lies a difficult and perilous reality for the Obama Administration as it tries to figure out what it's policies will be in Central America, indeed, in Latin America.
In Honduras there are two major political parties: Liberal and Conservative. Over history they have traded the presidency back and forth with neither having too much room to manuever given the overwhelming poverty of the country, the lack of real natural resources and the presence of a powerful military establishment which has been aligned with the business and social elite. All the presidents, from either party, have ties to the ruling elite.
Manuel Zelaya is from the Liberal party which just held its internal elections to name a Presidential candidate for the next elections to be held later this year. The candidate they chose was Elvin Ernesto Santos, the CEO of a large construction firm and, until his being named as the Presidential candidate, the Vice-President of Honduras. Upon being named the Liberal Presidential candidate, Santos resigned the Vice-Presidency. His biggest competitor in the race for the nomination was Roberto Micheletti, the head of the Congress and, now, the newly installed president of the Country. In other words, Zelaya is either a little bit too stupid or a true megalmaniac to think that he can defy the army, his own party and the elite who control all the parties by trying to establish himself as a President who rules above and beyond the influence of the traditional centers of power.
Still, you can be president and be stupid. For this reason, the majority of the Central American countries have one term limits on the presidency. And, even if you are stupid and subject to bouts of meglamania, the regional stability of democracies will be the basis by which the UN and the OAS take their positions with a vested interest in keeping the rule of law and the overt and covert power of the military establishments in check. So, for the army, even if mandated by the Supreme Court to do so, to pull off a coup is also a self-defeating and disempowering action. Other military establishments in the region manage to continue to have power and control without resorting to coups. It is doubtful that any other miliatry establishment in Central America would support the Honduran Military in this action. To the contrary, this action serves to ruin the tacit agreements within the neighboring countries as to how the military can exercise its power without resorting to coups which, for their destabilizing nature, no one likes.
The problem for the US is that these stupidities could have been avoided if Central American and US Military policy for the region were clear. The two Honduran Generals who had the most to do with the coup - Army General Romeo Vasquez and Air Force General Luis Suazo are both graduates of the US Army School of the Americas and the US has a rather significant military contingent in Honduras as part of the Southern Command on the grounds of a Honduran Air Base called Soto Cano about sixty miles from the capital. The combination of the military presence, the size of US Aid to Honduras and the fact the US is the leading trading partner of Honduras gives the US more power than to just "work to see that the coup would not have happened" as the reports are saying. The US had the power to stop the coup.
One question to be raised for the US public is to know why we did no use this power to its fullest and/or if there are major conflicts within the US administration between the military and state department on policy in Central/Latin America. That the US did not stop the coup is a sign that it does not yet have a firm grip on the policy or the pulse of Latin America because stopping the coup could hae avoided what now presents a series of difficulties that threaten to diminish the bright star that the Obama administration brought with it when assuming the US presidency.
Newly installed Micheletti has proven why his own party would not name his to be the presidential candidate with a series of statements the content of which is nothing more than bravado. Micheletti claims the military is ready to repulse any military intervention. The Honduran military is powerful within the politics of Honduras, but it is not an effective fighting force. It would crumble before any effective military action and the US controls the Honduran Air Force.
Of all the Central American presidents, only Daniel Ortega, his own star significantly diminished by a long history of disappointing personal and political decisions, has been vocal, above the crowd, in denouncing the coup. Hopefully this is the result of these presidents, mostly from the left of the political spectrum, recognizing that the rhetoric of Venezuelan's Chavez and Nicaragua's Ortega does nothing to further their strength for governing nor their party's ability to continue to win elections. In fact, Zelaya, by going the strongman route, only diminished the left's political power in the region by stirring up suspicions that all the leftist presidents are really strongmen looking to become hegemonic leaders instead of party leaders and social leaders of their countries for a better economic life for the people.
so the Honduran military has alienated not only the political elite of the region, but also the military elite. Micheletti has further divided his own party and alienated all of the other Latin American countries and Zelaya has destroyed his party's chances for the next election and has only Chavez and Ortega as true friends.
It is a conundrum because returning Zelaya to power does not resolve the underlying problems. Returning Zelaya is necessary if the OAS and UN are to continue as important players in the region. And, returning Zelaya is necessary for the Obama Administration to demonstrate that it has turned the corner on previous interventionist foreign policy. But, when Zelaya is returned to power, Honduras is still in turmoil and Chavez and Ortega are srengthened which is not good for serious leaders of politically leftist parties in Latin America.
The refusal to withdraw the US Ambassador to Honduras and the decision not to immediately suspend aid may be a continuation of President Obama's tendency toward dialogue and including everybody in and thinking long and hard before taking dramatic action, but it only serves to create doubt in Latin America's mind as to whether the US has really turned the corner on its interventionist past and allows a situation that could be resolved quickly to be drawn out with each continuing day of crisis allowing the conundrums to deepen.
President Obama missed an opportunity to strengthen the multi-national approach to foreign policy by lagging behind others in taking dramatic action and, at the same time, allowed a bad situation to fester and destabilize the area, allowing Chavez and Ortega the space to raise their rhetoric and, eventually, claim a victory for the same.
At best, the Obama Administration will need to learn, from this incident, that prevention is a hundred times better than reaction. And, we have not yet heard from the Republicans as to how they will use this incident to detain whatever initiatives President Obama could have in mind to further the opening up of space for normalizing relations with Cuba.
Everything in Latin America is a conundrum to begin with. Clear, decisive and preventative action in favor the values shared by the OAS should be defining criteria for the current US Administration in all its relationships with the countries who share the continent with us. And, it might be good to rethink whether we really need a military base in Honduras.
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